New Sciences and our Future
Our task to find "Human strategies in complexity" is directed by using scientific thinking. Our culture "has always included scientific rationality as its basic value" (Stepin 2003: 109). But since the 20th century there have been growing doubts about the role of rationality. Often the difference between "understanding" (Verstand) and "reason" (Vernunft) is forgotten. Rightly the sole use of understanding is criticised, but we have a hard time using reason.
Maybe the "New sciences" can help us. This new "post-non-classical" sciences (Stepin 2003: 85) like synergetics and concepts of self-organisation have new characteristics, which are more similar to a moving and interconnected world than the classical sciences and the "non-classical" sciences like quantum theory and (special or general) theory of relativity. To my mind, the enthusiasm about the paradigm shift sometimes runs away with us. I would like to suggest stopping and having a break in order to reconstruct the foundations of our scientific thinking in general. We need careful differentiations to get new integrated outlooks. If we see only correspondences of the new sciences with our desired worldviews weíll get only a flatland-unity (or "fusion", Wilber 1996: 11) of sciences and philosophy, a "unification" (Hofkirchner 2003: 133), not an "integration".
Therefore I want to look at the relation between science and worldview altogether. To understand what science really is I have to explain how science works and what its tasks are (in difference to philosophy). Because this topic is very complicated I only will deal with physics, as a fundamental and typical single science (mostly following Borzeszkowski and Wahsner). The founded epistemological speciality is also valid for the physical theories of self-organisation and synergetics. I spoke about self-organisation as a universal science and its relation to philosophy in Salecina (Schlemm 2003b). The shown necessity of epistemological preassumtions explains why science has its own limits. Weíll have to take these limits into consideration if we want to use science to build an adequate worldview. Under this conditions science itself doesnít enable us to explain and predict in a strong deterministic manner, but to understand the variety of possibilities in the world. Science canít and neednít tell us what to do. But it can tell us about possibilities and ways to create new possibilities in our acting.
Developing transdisciplinary needs deeper insights into the way sciences work. A detailed analysis of physics was already done by Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (see references). Probably much of their results are valid in other single sciences too, if the concrete epistemological preassumtions are adapted. The "principle of observability", which "stresses the limitations and relativity of our ideals" (Budanov, Savicheva 2003: 178) does not only exist in synergetics but in all sciences. "The way we see reality is the way we see reality" (Myelkow 2003, 82). The fact that there are special epistemological preassumtions distinguishes single sciences from philosophy. Before of hastily declaring scientific results as philosophic worldviews we have to analyse the given epistemological preassumtions in each case.
Since Enlightenment our worldview has been tightly connected with scientific results. We use "the scientific picture of the world as a reference point for new worldview" (Stepin 2003: 109). But there remains a difference between a single-science-theory and a (philosophical) worldview. "Mechanics" is the term for a physical theory with all limits of such a theory. A mechanistic worldview may be fed by such a theory, but it isnít the same. Therefore itís not correct to say, that Galileo and Newton "were very successful in describing the universe using this reduced mechanistic worldview" (Brunner, Klauninger 2003: 31). Although "Descartes introduced strict determinism into the methodology of science" (ibid.), Newton didnít follow him and even though "La Place stated that the universe was comparable to a clockwork of infinite precision" (ibid.) these sentences donít characterise modern-aged science at all. Such a characterisation of modern science since Galileo and Newton would be a reductionism of only one interpretation, like the interpretation of Newton by Voltaire (see Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1981 and Wahsner 1994).
To specify the relation of science and philosophy it will be helpful to analyse the work of science in detail.
I think it is accepted that science has to do with universals. The results of science are sentences about universals. But the form doesnít characterise the complete content. And the question remains how scientists get their results.
Some theories of science assume that the world would be an amount of individuals. The mainstream-philosophy of science is based on Bertrand Russell who expressedly emphasised that all relation between things must be external relations, not internal, because otherwise mathematics wouldnít work. We can think the world as an manifold assembly of things connected by relations and we donít need to take into consideration the whole (Russell 1992: 161). Most theories of science reject "metaphysicism". But there is another philosophy of science, which proceeds from the assumption that the world is a self-developing whole through inner contradictions. It is not a blurred, mashed monotony but a "self-particularising or self-specifying" (Hegel Enc.I: 321) ever-processing totality. Now we have to ask how we come from the inexhaustible, but subdivided whole to our knowledge and which relationship our knowledge has with this world.
We are parts of the world, we participate in its totality Ė but we are only finite moments. All our relations within the world are finite, several relations grasp several aspects of the world. Art, Work and also science are such relations. Relations realize the unity of the moments Ė but the moments differ from each other in some aspects. The difference between knowledge-subject and object is mediated through means of cognition. Often these means are hidden or forgotten. Means are not only technical devices, but also theoretical preassumtions or hypotheses, models and mathematics. (Hörz 1966: 63f.). Like technical devices the other means are changed in scientific development. Ernst Bloch stressed that the questions to nature, the region of the experiencability (Raum des Erfahrbaren) and the audible answers will change with the change of society (Bloch MP: 341). Therefore no knowledge is complete "true", no knowledge shows or represents the world without the difference given by means of cognition. And no means are more "natural" than others. Goethe criticized the artificiality of Newtonís means (Goethe 1833: 21). He tried to use only "natural" means of cognition. Human beings are a special status of nature. Therefore all that humans can do, is realisation and expanding possibilities of nature. Nothing is "unnatural".
Different means of cognitions (like Goetheís and Newtonís) offer us different parts of knowledge, and we canít speak about the "truth" of knowledge without speaking about the respectively used means of cognition. In this sense neither Goethe got the "whole truth" about colours nor did Newton.
Physics deals with non-living things and their behaviour. The topics of modern-aged physics are not properties (like the former occult qualities), but the behaviour of things. The focus on behaviour stresses that no object, no thing is absolutely isolated. Objects in physics (since Galileo) are idealized Ė but (since Newton) never fully isolated. Therefore we can relieve the reproach of mechanicism. The Newtonian Mechanics is not a theory with particles (Blochís "block-matter") and pushes.
Because the Newtonian Theory bases on the Galilean law of inertia ( "Every body remains in its state of rest or in rectilinear uniform motion unless it is forced to change its state by acting forces") rest isnít the base and motion isnít pushed by impulses or forces. Rectilinear uniform motion is the base (the standard motion) and rest is only one special case.
Thus mechanics makes the necessary cut not between rest and motion but between rectilinear uniform motion and accelerated motion, cut in the sense that the first is supposed to be a motion etalon and that only motions deviating from it are explained by physical dynamics. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1998: 17)
Newton took the Galilean law as the preassumtion of his Mechanics. To define a rectilinear uniform motion we need the Euclidian space. In this sense Newton defined his absolute space and absolute time as a preassumtion of the dynamics. This space and this time is not the "real" space and time, it is an epistemological preassumtion.
Because of these preassumtions in the Newtonian theory motion is not an external induced property, it is the topic of physics itself. There is no resting, isolated thing! This corresponds to the remarked meaning of behaviour instead of properties. We see that the appropriate understanding of the "boring" Newtonian Mechanics can show us some important features of the "most mechanical" science, which is often misinterpreted. The topics of physics are not the bodies themselves but the changes of their behaviour, of their motion which are described by measurable quantities and forces (not as "causes" of the change of motion but because they are equivalent to them).
Motion as the topic of physics carries a problem: the problem of the contradictions of motion, known since Zenon:
Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion isexistent contradiction itself. (Hegel WdL II: 76, transl. by Miller)
Eleatics thought that the world could not be in such contradicting motion, because we canít recognise such a world. The Heracliteans assumed that the world is an ever-moving world, but they approved that we couldnít recognize it. Renate Wahsner showed (Wahsner 2002: 460), how the Atomists found a way out: If there would be moving things (atoms) and, in addition, an area of emptiness, we can imagine and recognise motion of the atoms through the empty space.
Contradictions of motion became thinkable without logical contradictions because of this distinction between matter and space. Such an epistemological distinction was called "dualism" by R. Wahsner and H.-H.v. Borzeszkowski (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1998: 15).
Dualism is a means of cognition. Immanuel Kant understood the epistemological function of the Newtonian absolute space and time. Absolute space and time is a preassumtion for physics, it is not explained by the theory, it is not a part of the explained real world. Kant assumed that the a priori assumption will always be the same. Now we know that the change of them is typical for progress in evolution of science. And these preassumtions not only deal with space and time. We find this feature of science also with respect to the cut between the rectilinear uniform motion (a priori presupposed as the standard motion) and accelerated motion (equivalent to dynamical forces). It is necessary to enable us to measure some forms of behaviour of the objects.
Each measurable quantity and calculating science is based on thought determinations not explained by this science but presupposed by it. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 289)
Physics does not only need thinking without logical contradictions. It needs a connection to the real world, given by objective sensuousness (gegenständliche Sinnlichkeit) mediated by experiments and measurements. Therefore the preassumtions of such experiments and measurements are especially important as means of cognitions in physics and similar single sciences. Experiments and measurements in modern physics are not "unnatural" Ė but they are means produced by human beings in order to recognise the world. If we want to understand the relationship between world and our knowledge we must take into account our means, too.
Physics doesnít deal with the real self-contradicting things. It deals with some aspects of their behaviour which can be described by Mathematics and which can be compared with reality by experiments and measurements. These are the measurable quantities.
Measurable quantities require comparisibility. But like Nicholas of Cusa already knew, in reality there is no thing which has exactly the same qualities like another thing (Cues: 35,73). But there is also order, harmony and proportion (ibid. 75), and we have to find out how to compare several qualities within this framework. Hermann Helmholtz pointed out that "for deciding about equality, it is necessary to know the method according to which the comparison is to be made" (Helmholtz 1903/1984: 38). Measurable quantities are produced by humans, they are "measurement-theoretically determined thought entities" (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 64). These quantities are not fully arbitrary Ė they have to correspond to real equalities of behaviour. Such a quantity is an abstraction in this sense: we build nouns from verbs (compare Helmholtz 1903/1984, 23). But the abstraction is not a mathematical one: We do not only get abstract abstract possibilities of behaviour, we get actual possibilities.
For physics the measurable quantities appear as its objects, but the epistemological analysis shows that they are actually means of cognition.
In the measurable quantities we can see also the above explained dualism. The measurable quantities time (t) and space-coordinates (q) belong to the epistemological preassumtions, the measurable quantity velocity (v) in kinematics and acceleration (a) in dynamics belong to the theory.
We can prove how this dualism takes the dialectical contradiction of motion as dualism: The contradiction of motion is that "something Ö at once is and is not". Beside time (t) and space (q) we use a third quantity velocity (v), which implies a reference to other places. "This does not result in a logical contradiction because there are two different quantities that are algebraically independent from each other and that can be assigned to the same body at the same time point t." (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 13)
Physics conceives the (dialectical) contradiction in the form of dualisms in such a manner that it separates the momenta existing only in a unity and distributes them to the different sides of dualism [Ö] (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 43)
The epistemological means of each single science differs from the epistemological means of another single science. The mediation of knowledge subjects and objects depends on the concrete quality of the objects (physical, biotical or social characteristics are distinguished).
In system theories like cybernetics it found that all objects also have comparable behaviour. The topic of the universal sciences is such comparable, common behaviour. It was found that there is a common law in electrical engineering, which says: "effect = characteristic of the system x cause" (see Wunsch 1985: 35). Later cybernetics became the general theory of behaviour of any objects seen as elements within systems. Systems are an"ordered whole" (Liebscher 1996: S. 860) of a set of elements and relations between them (Steinbacher 1999: 1579). Such systems can maintain themselves and sometimes also generate themselves. We're speaking about autonomy and autopoiesis (more in detail see Collier 2003). This leads the attention to the inner dynamic of the systems.
The abstraction from the concreteness leads to a distinction of the concrete thing from its behaviour. Only the behaviour is a topic of general sciences. "The question isnít what a thing is, but what it does" (Ashby 1974). This abstraction takes the concrete sources of development away. We speak about evolution, we can formalise not only continuous change, but discontinuous behaviour at bifurcation-points too. But we lost the concrete sources of development within the quality of the things themselves. Therefore the "problem of emergence" emerges. We can describe evolution, but we canít really explain it.
Theories of self-organization belong in a more narrow sense to a special field of physics, thermodynamics, and in a wider sense to system-theory.
Self-organization in thermodynamics bases on the same epistemological foundations like physics at al. Thermodynamics uses measurable quantities like other fields of physics and its relation to reality doesnít differ from other fields of natural science.
We call models thermodynamic, which refer to thermodynamic quantities, such as amount of substance, energy, entropy and their flows. (Ebeling 1990: 36)
It was said that "irreversible thermodynamics is the actual realistic thermodynamics because all real processes are always irreversible" (Schnakenberg 1998). But there is no question which theory would be "more realistic". Every scientific description (reversible and irreversible thermodynamics too) bases on preassumtions, which donít allow an ontologisation of their categories.
And there is another argument against the idea that the theory of self-organization would be quite another world-view than "older" physics:
Since there is no sharp boundary between dynamical physics and thermodynamics (because time-directed solutions may be deduced from the basis laws under certain supplementary conditions), we might suggest that the second law of thermodynamics can be derived from the laws of dynamical physics, too, by assuming supplementary conditions. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 292)
New aspects of physics of self-organization are the consideration of non-equilibrium-processes and the possibility of changing quantitiesin leaps and bounds.
But like Borzeszkowski and Wahsner showed, "the new features in regard to time appearing in thermodynamics are not founded on the dynamical laws but rather on supplementary conditions compatible with them." (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 294) And because thermodynamics doesnít deal with the specific quality of the processing things, it canít explain real evolution. The specific universality (thermodynamic systems as its objects) is the advantage of the thermodynamic theory of self-organization but also it gives reason for its limits.
Of course the process of cognition seems to be a "dialog" now (Prigogine, Stengers 1986) Ė but there is nothing said about specific (concrete, historical) means of cognition! The object doesnít become a "subject", like a subject is defined in philosophy (a self reflecting self-confidenced being). There is nothing said except the general knowledge, that the "nature recognizes itself", because human beings belong to nature too. But to characterise recognizing beings as natural beings and subjective beings we need more than the abstract theory of self-organisation.
The new aspect of self-organization as an universal theory in comparison with physics is that its universal is more abstract than the physical universals. It reduces the totality of world quite more (see Warnke 1974/1981: 138).
The often used category "complexity" grasps qualities only in a quantitative, formal form, not qualitatively, concretely in content. Our theory of self-organization understands only the form of processes and evolution, not the content. It says how processes and evolution work, but not, what is changing and wherethe evolution goes.
Like classical physics the theory of self-organization "doesnít exclude history, but it doesnít grasp it immediately" (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1989: 133). The described processes are nothing but moments of complete cycles of evolution; they donít describe the development itself. We can reproduce the emergence of new structures formally, but we are not able to grasp ("begreifen", not only "verstehen") its concrete content. The problem of emergence canít be solved.
That physics neither can be turned into a theory of development or can describe the world in its totality results from the fact that it has to determine and presuppose etalons in order to become a measuring science. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1999: 256)
Our scientific results have to be used in our practice. But in which way do they influence our orientation? Usually there is discussed the deductive-nomological view on explanation and prediction using scientific laws. We can derive a deduction or conclusion from premises, which contain a law. (Hempel 1965; explained by Hofkirchner 2003, 136). Here concrete, real facts are taken as subsumed by "covering laws".
This view is only one possible interpretation of real science. It uses only the (logical) form of the results of science and doesnít take the scientific work of human beings as a process into consideration. If we expand philosophy of science from pure logic to analysis of science as such a process weíll understand that even Newtonian theory canít be reduced to an abstract deductive-nomological view. Even in the Newtonian theory a scientific fact is never "considered as an event that is mechanistically determined by laws" (Myelkow). The mechanicistic interpretation of the Newtonian theory, like shown by Hofkirchner (Hofkirchner 2003, 139), is only one, the best known interpretation. But it isnít the only one! We mustn't identify this interpretation of the theory with the content of the theory itself.
If we want to determine, how natural or other laws determine our possibilities or our acting must to differ between several types of determination. Causation is only one of them. Also law and causation is not the same (even in classical sciences). What are important aspects of this problem?
In Schlemm (2003a: 56) I wrote about the relativity of lawfulness relating to the hierarchical system structure. We canít determine whether the "world itself" is strictly determined or not. Therefore a dialectic of necessary (behaviour of the system) and chance (within the behaviour of the elements) is given in classical sciences, too.
A law is determined to describe the "general, necessary, and essential connections in the interacting system" (Hörz 1982: 217). Causality Ė in difference Ė is the effect on a system as a cause, which through a given complex of conditions leads to a field of possibilities, from which possibilities are realized (Hörz 2003: 9). Causation is not the only determination, that means the variety of conditions canít be described merely by causation (Hörz 2003: 10). Whereas a law is a reproducible and universal-necessary connection, causality is the directed mediation of a lawful connection in time. "Each law exists as connection in a complex of causal relations" (Hörz 1976a: 371), but it is not identical with "causation" itself.
Laws are not only "general, necessary, and essential connections" at all, but "under certain conditions" (ibid.: 366). The law doesnít directly describe the behaviour of objects. It describes only the possible behaviour while additional (real) initial and boundary conditions determine the (real) behaviour of the objects. If there are planets around a star theyíll behave like written in the Keplerian laws. But how many planets there are around a star and where they are is a question outside these laws. With respect to these laws these aspects are accidental.
The Newtonian law of motion [ d/dt (mv) = F ] gives an infinite set of possible trajectories. To get a description of real motion we have to add specific initial conditions. This formula is not absolute abstract because it describes actual possibilities. But it doesnít describe reality itself, the real process, because it gives only the possibilities.
Also classical physics doesnít deal only with strictly determined processes. The role of conditions and the difference between causality and law is valid for that science, too. Therefore, in this type of science we already have to take a dialectic of necessity and chance into consideration. "Dialectical Determinism" doesnít mean strict causation, but the "theory, that all objects and processes are conditioned and determined within an entire connection with other objects and processes (Hörz 1976a: 356). This corresponds with the "less-than-strict-determinism" (Hofkirchner 2003: 135). The view on determinism depends on the level: a "system" is defined to be a self-reproducing entity and therefore we get a dynamical law for the behaviour of the systems. Its elements may have more "freedom"; their behaviour isnít fully determined by the laws of the system. (see: Law and system hierarchy). There is a connection, a unity of the accidental behaviour of the elements and the necessary tendency of the system. "Ö The can-be is also lawful" (Bloch SO: 172).
All these aspects are united in the Integrated law (called by H. Hörz, who established it, "Statistical Law):
The philosophical conception of the statistical law regards laws (systems of laws) as general, necessary, and essential connections between objects and processes in a system, where, under the conditions of the system, a possibility is necessarily realized (dynamic aspect), but where there is a field of possibilities for the elements. A probability distribution exists for the random realization of this field (stochastic aspect) and the transition from one state into another is conditionally realizes by chance with a certain degree of probability (probabilistic aspect). (Hörz 1982: 215)
Necessity is given, if a wholeness of conditions is given. In each concrete situation the given wholeness of conditions selects the "necessarily realizing" possibility (possibilities). We can select or create new conditions (building bridges or houses!), because of our existence and actions are parts of conditions.
If we take into consideration the decisive role of conditions, we can assume that a change of conditions can also change the operation of laws. Within laws there is a given field of possibilities for the behaviour of the elements. As long as the field of possibilities is stable, the stochastical distribution may change. This is called modification type I by Hörz and Wessel (1983: 134). But the field of possibilities may also change, firstly as long as the dynamic aspect remains (modification type II, ibid.). We know that in real evolution processes there is another modification type: the law itself may vanish, if its conditions of existence are vanishing. Depending on the new conditions other laws will emerge and with them their fields of possibilities. In this connection we find the "emergence of causes" (Dobronravova 2003, 21), as well, but in a wider view.
The new sciences, like theory of self-organisation, add some new aspects into this view. The most important new aspect is the high sensibility to small accidental influences at the bifurcation points (Dobronravova 2003, 19), sometimes called "effect of butterflies". This characterizes a specific "chance", spontaneity as the "third kind" of determination between determinism and indeterminism (Myelkow 2003, 78), the decisive role of a "singular individual" (Niedersen 1990: 79; cf. Schlemm 2003a: 69). Already in 1967 Herbert Hörz spoke about such situations, he mentioned the "essential chance" (Hörz 1967: 864), which can lead to qualitative changes of systems. After development of self-organisation-theories we can specify our knowledge about the constitutive role of chances. We know fluctuations as "variations between two possible states of the system at least, from which one possible state realises itself, without possibility of determination of the conditions for this possibility" (Hörz 2002).
The modification of fields of possibilities are connected with the possibility of ramifying at bifurcation points. We have to take the breaking of symmetries in a new way into consideration (Hörz 1988: 217).
It is clear, that new properties, developing in the process of self-organisation, "cannot be predicted from even perfect knowledge of the old properties" (Brunner, Klauninger 2003, 323f.).
The determination of each step of non-linear dynamics with the help of iteration formulas in non-linear studies does not provide the possibility of long-term predictions due to the influences of small differences in parameter values (these differences already exist at least because of quantum fluctuations. (Dobronravova 2003, 22)
All our knowledge canít tell us what will happen. Firstly we have to take the difference of our knowledge and the real world because of the epistemological preassumtions (see 2.2.) and secondly, the knowledge itself contains fields of possibilities (see 3.) into consideration.
By means of statistical laws we can give trends of future, but we canít set up exact forecasts. (Hörz 2002).
We mustnít identify a law with a tendency, because itís possible and necessary to combine contradicting tendencies, too (Hörz 1974: 1211). Only fields of possibilities and distributions of probability are given in an objective sense (Hörz 1976b: 960).
Historical necessity, field of possibilities, conditions and distributions of probability remain objective, can be recognised and can be used by the selection of the possibility, which will be realised. (Hörz 1974: 1209)
The world is not absolutely undetermined. We can understand components of these determinations, because of mutual interactions, of a general coherence of worldly processes. Because of given conditions in each moment the evolution contains "relative goals", which are the main-tendencies within a given field of possibility (see Hörz 2002). In society there are more mediations between objectively given conditions and subjective behaviour than in nature without conscious beings. The societal life of humans gives them the additional possibility to change the conditions of their society. Therefore the acting of human beings is more free than determined by given laws. But law and freedom are not only contradictions, they need each other in a dialectic way.
We can only speak about the dialectic of law and freedom if we speak about practical life, about actions of humans. Although human acting may overcome (societal) laws, its effectiveness dependssimultaneously on the existence of laws.
By means of statistical laws we can give trends of future, but we canít set up exact forecasts. The contrast to a mechanistical view isnít connected with the view that future wouldnít be designable. World is changing within laws and not without rules (Hörz 2002).
We spoke about objective "relative goals". People can decide freely, whether they want to realize such a goal or if they change the conditions in another way. Only if such a decision is taken, "objective demands" will exist to reach such a decided goal. In order to reach the goal the conditions have to be changed in the right way, depending on determinations and laws. In such a way "freedom is realised necessity, because freedom of actions is really mediated with the law of necessity" (Bloch 1954: 546). "Will is matched with the course of the things" (ibid.) and will become an "especially active part of the realised tendency" (ibid.). The societal acting of human beings becomes a part of the conditions (Hörz 1973: 182).
The subjective factor may change the layer of conditions, may cancel them or create new conditions. But it canít change the laws, which are prerequisites of changing, cancelling and creating. (Bloch 1954: 548)
Strategies of acting between knowledge of conditions and
Sciences of society can show, "which essential conditions have to be realised, in order to realize the wished possibility" (Hörz 1967: 864). Human beings are able to act, "producing the conditions, which are realising the possibility which is contained in the law and which is wished" (ibid.: 865). In this way we get a "responsible activism" (dialectic of the feasible and the desirable) (Hofkirchner 2003, 148).
Knowledge doesnít directly give instructions for actions and our subjective will canít immediately change reality. We have to analyse several mediations like norms and interests.
Freedom in action isnít a amuck run, but active unison with matured and maturing lawful conditions. Objective law is not a boundary, but a helpful baton for a demand, which aims at a better future. (Bloch 1954: 566)
Sometimes the possibility to decide within a given field of possibility is stressed (Hörz 1968: 331). Sometimes it is said that new scopes can emerge (Hörz 1968: 331).
Freedom is realizing of possibilities as goals of acting, which are contained in the field of possibilities of laws, based oncompetent decisions. (Hörz 1991: 75).
Laws themselves can be modified by changing the fields of possibility and probabilities (Hörz, Wessel 1983: 134). But the most important possibility of acting is the change of existence of fundamental laws at all. The question, whether this possibility is taken into consideration, distinguishes different types of future-research.
Another question is whether the given conditions or the goals are primary. Usually we think that the real world, the given conditions are the starting point. But human beings are not only products of their conditions, they have the ability to anticipate and anticipation determines their motivations. Therefore "not the hardness of their situation and the imposed suffering are motives to think another state, in which the people would have a better life; on the contrary toil and sufferingreveal in a different light and we decide that they are unbearable from that day we can think another state." (Sartre 1943: 756).
Because of this dialectic of acting and knowing human freedom doesnít need indeterminism. Because all parts of the world are connected in a (dialectially) determined way, we have possibilities to change them by creating new societal laws, new fields of possibilities and selections from that fields. The laws and fields of possibilities in society are mainly determined by the evolution of productive forces (which contain human abilities and needs!). But the individual behaviour of human beings has another type of individual possibility. With respect to societal laws humans are "only" the elements, they have their own field of possibilities (cf. Holzkamp 1983). Therefore individuals not only products of their societal environment, "one is always responsible for what is made of one" (Sartre 1969: 45).
Ashby, William Ross (1974): Einführung in die Kybernetik. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.
Bloch, Ernst (1954): Über Freiheit und objektive Gesetzlichkeit, im Prozess gesehen. In: Bloch, Ernst: Philosophische Aufsätze zur objektiven Phantasie Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1985. S. 531-567.
Bloch, Ernst (MP): Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1985.
Bloch, Ernst (SO): Subjekt-Objekt. Erläuterungen zu Hegel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1985.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (1981): Newton und Voltaire. Zur Begründung und Interpretation der klassischen Mechanik. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (1988): Evolutionism as Modern Form of Mechanicism. Science in Context. 2 (1988) 287-306.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (1989): Physikalischer Dualismus und dialektischer Widerspruch. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (1998): Dualism of Physical Space-Time and Dynamics as a Consequence of the possibility to Measure and Calculate Motion. In: Mechanicism and Dualism. Ideals on the Epistemological Status of Physics. Preprint 99 of Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. Berlin .pp. 15-27.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (1999): Not even classical mechanics is mechanistic. In: D. Aerts, J.v.d. Veken and H. van Belle (eds.): Worldviews and the Problem of Synthesis. Vol. 4: The yellow Book of "Einstein Meets Magritte". Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dortrecht-New York. p. 251-262.
Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von; Wahsner, Renate (2001): Action and Reaction. Studies on Motion and Contradiction in Physics. Berlin: Logos Verlag.
Brunner, Klaus, A.; Klauninger, Bert (2003): An Integrative Image of Causality and Emergence. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 23-35.
Budanov, Vladimir; Savicheva, Natalya (2003): Principles of Synergetics. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 167-181.
Collier, John (2003): Fundamental Properties of Self-Organisation. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 150-166.
Cues, Nicolaus von: Von der Wissenschaft des Nichtwissens. In: Des Cardinals und Bischofs Nicolaus von Cusa wichtigste Schriftten in deutscher Übersetzung von F. A. Scharpff, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1862.
Descartes, René (1644/1870): Prinzipien der Philosophie. In: René Descartes' philosophische Werke. Übersetzt, erläutert und mit einer Lebensbeschreibung des Descartes versehen von J. H. von Kirchmann, Abteilung I-III, Berlin: L. Heimann, 1870 (Philosophische Bibliothek, Bd. 25/26).
Dobronravova, Irina (2003): Cause of Emergence or Emergence of Cause? In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 19-22.
Ebeling, Werner (1990): Das Neue in der natürlichen und technischen Evolution. In: Das Neue und seine Entstehung und Aufnahme in Natur und Gesellschaft. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. S. 19-44.
Fuchs, Christian (2003): Dialectical Philosophy and Self-organisation. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 195-244.
Goethe, Johann, Wolfgang (1833): Analyse und Synthese. (aus Goethes Nachlass in der Ausgabe letzter Hand 1833) In: Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun. S. 20-23.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (Enc.I): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Erster Teil. Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (WdL II): Wissenschaft der Logik. Bd. II. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1986.
Helmholtz, Hermann von (1903/1984): Einleitung zu den Vorlesungen über Theoretische Physik. In: Rompe, Robert; Treder Hans-Jürgen (Hrsg.): Zur Grundlegung der theoretischen Physik. Beiträge von H.v. Helmholtz und H. Hertz. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1984.
Hempel, Carl G. (1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press.
Hofkirchner, Wolfgang (2003): A New Way of Thinking and a New World View. On the Philosophy of Self-Organisation I. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 131-149.
Holzkamp, Klaus (1983): Grundlegung der Psychologie. Berlin-New York: Campus Verlag.
Hörz; Herbert (1966): Materialismus und moderne Physik. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Sonderheft 1966: Materialismus und moderne Naturwissenschaft. S. 47-69.
Hörz, Herbert (1967): Mensch und Wissenschaft. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 15 (1967) 7. S. 840-867.
Hörz, Herbert (1968): Die Rolle statistischer Gesetze in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften und ihre Bedeutung für die Prognose. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 16 (1968) 3, S. 327-335.
Hörz, Herbert (1973): Die Bedeutung statistischer Gesetze in den Gesellschaftswissenschaften. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 21 (1973) 2, S. 174-189.
Hörz, Herbert (1974): Objektive gesellschaftliche Gesetze und Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 22 (1974) 10, S. 1206-1217.
Hörz; Herbert (1976a): Marxistische Philosophie und Naturwissenschaften. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Hörz, Herbert (1976b): Statistische Gesetze, Wirkungsmechanismus und individuelles Verhalten. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 24 (1976) 8, S. 958-971.
Hörz, Herbert (1982): Dialectical Contradictions in Physics. In: Dialectical Contradictions: contemporary marxist discussion. Studies in Marxism. 10. Minneapolis. Ed. by Erwin Marquit, Philip Moran and Willis H. Truitt. pp.201-223.
Hörz, Herbert (1988): Wissenschaft als Prozeß. Grundlagen einer dialektischen Theorie der Wissenschaftsentwicklung. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Hörz, Herbert (1991): Determination und Selbstorganisation. Zur Zufallsaufassung von Erwin Schrödinger. Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftsforschung. Graz. Band 6/1991. pp. 67-82.
Hörz, Herbert (2002): Heisenberg Ė Determinismus und die Folgen. In: G. Klose, K. Reiprich (Hrsg.): Werner Heisenberg. Vorträge zum 100. Geburtstag. Rohrbacher Kreis, Sonderh. Leipzig: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen, 2002, S. 21Ė48.
Hörz, Herbert (2003): Quantenphysik und Lebensgestaltung. Bemerkungen zur Kritik von Klaus Fuchs am mechanischen Determinismus. Vortrag auf dem Kolloquium zum Gedenken an Klaus Fuchs am 14.11.2003 in Berlin während des Kongresses der Leibniz-Sozietät und der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Kybernetik zum November 2003. (will be edited in English by Erwin Marquit)
Hörz, Herbert; Wessel, Karl-Friedrich (1983): Philosophische Entwicklungstheorie. Weltanschauliche, erkenntnistheoretische und methodologische Probleme der Naturwissenschaften. Berlin. VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
Liebscher, Heinz (1996): Stichwort "System". In: Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Wörterbuch. Hrsg. von H. Hörz, H. Liebscher, R. Löther, E. Schmutzer, S. Wollgast. Wiesbaden: fourier.
Lorenzen, Paul (1964/1988): Wie ist Objektivität der Physik möglich? In: Methodisches Denken. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. S. 142-151.
Lorenzen, Paul (1987): Lehrbuch der konstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie. Mannheim, Wien, Zürich: Wissenschaftsverlag.
Miller, A.V.: Translation of Hegelís Science of Logic. George Allen & Unwin, 1969. In Internet: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/hl_index.htm.
Myelkov, Yuriy (2003): The Spontaneity of Emergent Events and the Formation of Facts. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 76-84.
Newton, Isaac (Princ): Mathematische Principien der Naturlehre. Mit Bemerkungen und Erläuterungen. Berlin: Verlag von Robert Oppenheim. 1872.
Newton, Isaac (Optics): Optik oder Abhandlungen von den Spiegelungen, Brechungen, Beugungen und den Farben des Lichts. In: Borzeszkowski, Horst-Heino von, Wahsner, Renate (1981): Newton und Voltaire. Zur Begründung und Interpretation der klassischen Mechanik. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. p. 137-172.
Niedersen, Uwe (1990): Diskussion. In: Niedersen (Hrsg.): Komplexität-Zeit-Methode (VI). Wachstum. Muster. Determination. Halle (Saale) Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge 1990/20 (A 124), pp. 78-79.
Prigogine, Ilya; Stengers, Isabelle (1986): Dialog mit der Natur. Neue Wege naturwissenschaftlichen Denkens. Frankfurt am Main, Olten, Wien: Büchergilde Gutenberg.
Russell, Bertrand (1931/2001): The scientific outlook. London, New York: Routledge.
Russell, Bertrand (1992): Philosophie. Die Entwicklung meines Denkens. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1943): Das Sein und das Nichts. Versuch einer phänomenologischen Ontologie. Reinbek: Rowohlt. 1997.
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1969): Interview: Itinerary of a Thought. New Left Review 58 (1969). pp. 43-66.
Schlemm, Annette (1998): What do we bring the futures? http://www.thur.de/philo/aszu1e.htm.
Schlemm, Annette (1999): Daß nichts bleibt, wie es istÖ Philosophie der selbstorganisierten Entwicklung. Band II: Möglichkeiten menschlicher Zukünfte. Münster: LIT-Verlag.
Schlemm, Annette (2002): Different types of thinking about different things - Part I -. Lecture at the project meeting "Human Strategies in Complexity" in Vienna. http://www.thur.de/philo/hegel/ hegel_en1.htm.
Schlemm, Annette (2003a): An Integrated Notion of "Law". In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 56-75.
Schlemm, Annette (2003b): Ersetzt Selbstorganisationsdenken die Dialektik? Vortrag für die Ernst-Bloch-Assoziation in der Stiftung Salecina/Maloja (CH) http://www.thur.de/philo/project/salecina/ salecina.htm.
Schnakenberg, Jürgen (1998): Irreversible Thermodynamik. Internet: http://bibsrv.physik.rwth-aachen.de/Skripte/HTML/Schnakenberg/Thermo99/thbx/node23.html.
Steinbacher, Karl (1999): Stichwort "System/Systemtheorie". In: Enzyklopädie Philosophie. Hrsg.v. H.-J. Sandkühler. Hamburg: Meiner.
Stepin, Vyacheslav (2003): Evolutionism, the Anthropic Principle, and New Rationality. In: Vladimir Arshinov, Christian Fuchs (eds.), Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation. Moscow: NIA-Priroda. pp. 85-130.
Wahsner, Renate (1994): "Ich bin der Apostel und Märtyrer der Engländer gewesen" Die Repräsentation Newtons durch Voltaire. In: Naturauffassungen in Philosophie, Wissenschaft, Technik. Band II. Renaissance und frühe Neuzeit. Hrsg.v. Lothar Schäfer und Elisabeth Ströker. Freiburg,München: Verlag Karl Alber.
Wahsner, Renate (2002): Dualism between space-time and matter analyzed from epistomogical point of view. In: P.G. Bergmann and V. de Sabbata (eds.): Advances in the Interplay Between Quantum and Gravity Physics. 459-475.
Wallace, William: Translation of Hegelís Logic: Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (abridged). In Internet: http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/ Hegel%20Logic%20ToC.htm.
Warnke Camilla (1974/1981): Relativismus statt Dialektik? Zum Funktionalismus von N. Luhmann und H. Rombach. In: Peter Ruben, Camilla Warnke: Philosophische Schriften I. Aarhus, Paris, Florenz: edition etalon. 1981. S. 131-140.
Wilber, Ken (1996): A Brief History of Everything. Boston, London: Shambhala.
Wunsch, Gerhard (1985): Geschichte der Systemtheorie. Dynamische Systeme und Prozesse. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
To the project "Philosophy of Humans and their Science and Philosophy"